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T he convention is that development studies cover 
only the ‘developing' countr ies of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, a sort of academic counterpart 
of O X F A M . But this convention is ceasing to be 
viable for European social scientists, and indeed 
it is starting to be harmful. The assumption that 
‘their’ problems are intrinsically dilferent from 
‘ours’ is not merely patronising; it has become a 
h indrance to the transfer of experience. It is also 
associated with political comm itment of a sort 
that hinders professional progress.
The extension of development studies to Europe
The artificiality of the distinction between ‘devel­
oped’ and ‘developing’ is perhaps most obvious 
in Europe. Portugal,  for example, has been a 
mem ber of O EC D 's Development Assistance 
Committee, as well as the group of ‘developed 
m arket economies’ at U N C T A D . Yet anyone 
familiar with ‘developing’ countries, especially 
in Latin America, finds the Portuguese scene 
instantly recognisable (Bienefeld and Seers, 1976). 
A similar structural dualism, with much lower 
incomes, worse social conditions and higher 
fertility in the (relatively large) population of the 
rural areas. A similar concentration in the ow ner­
ship of property, especially land. A similar pattern 
of trade, with tourist services, primary products 
and textiles exchanged for arms, equipment, inter­
mediate products and sophisticated consumer 
goods. A similar prevalence of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) in secondary industry and 
the services (especially big hotels). Similar 
inappropriate technologies and associated chronic 
unemployment, relieved (as in many ‘developing’ 
countr ies especially in Central America and the 
Caribbean) by large-scale migration abroad. A 
not very different cultural dependence on foreign 
styles of consumption and on imported ideologies, 
fed by foreign firms, television programmes, etc. 
The same sort of bureaucracy with a striking 
combination of complacency and inefficiency. 
Similar organised terrorism of both Right and 
Left and similar political manipulation by dom i­
nant powers.
Two basic politico-economic patterns characterise 
'developing' countries. In one, a mili tary d ic ta tor­
ship maintains a strong and stable currency by
creating a favourable  climate for foreign capital,  
which implies suppressing trade un ion  activity 
and political opposition; in the other, a ‘sof t’ 
government is unable to resolve internal class 
conflicts, the symptoms of its failure being chronic 
inflation and foreign exchange difficulties, relieved 
only by periodic deva lua tion .1 Portugal has 
demonstrated  both patterns recently— the form er 
before the 1974 coup, the latter after  it. Such a 
sudden and complete political som ersault is also 
itself characteristic.
Roughly similar socio-economic features and  pa t­
terns, including heavy dependence on labour 
migration and tourism, can be seen in many  co u n ­
tries of Southern E urope— Spain, Malta, Y ugosla­
via, Greece, Cyprus and T u rk ey — and also in the 
Irish Republic and Finland. So ‘Third  W o rld ’ 
experience—for example in dealing with the 
T N C s— is likely to be relevant to their problems 
too. Their  social sciences would also gain from 
an injection of the work of Latin American 
theorists— as has indeed started to occur 
(G uzm an, 1976); this is likely to be more a p p ro ­
priate to such countries than neo-classical econo­
mics, or other theories im ported from  culturally 
dom inan t countries.2
But if ‘development studies’ are  to cover these 
countries, why no t Italy too? It shows m any of 
the same characteristics, notably  a big economic 
and social gap between the cities of the N o r th  
and the rural areas of the South  (including Sicily 
and Sardinia).  It displays economic, cultural and 
political dependence (including reliance on foreign 
tourism and labour migration), though less than 
in Portugal.  Successive Italian governm ents  have 
also faced typical ‘Latin A m erican’ p roblem s of 
chronic foreign exchange deficits and inflation, 
especially since the 1973 rise in the price of oil. 
And if Italy, why not Britain, the o ther  econo­
mically ‘w eak’ m em ber of the EEC? It is true 
that Britain is— in contrast to most ‘developing’
1 T h ere  are o f cou rse h yb rid s, e sp ec ia lly  w h ere (as in A rgentin a  
and C h ile ) the structural cau ses o f  in flation are too  d e e p -  
seated  to be eradicated  by ev en  ru th less m ilitary  reg im es.
2 I D S , in co llab oration  w ith  C L A C S O , is ab ou t to issu e  a 
se le c t  b ib liography o f key Latin  A m erican  w ritin gs on  
d ev eo lp m en t (w ith  referen ces  to E n g lish  and F ren ch  tran s­
lations w h ere available).
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countr ies— highly industrialised and urbanised. 
Although Scotland, Wales and N orthern  Ireland 
are in some senses less developed than South-East 
and Central England, regional economic inequali­
ties are mitigated by a powerful fiscal machine. 
Poverty, even in the H ighlands of Scotland, 
is not com parab le  with what can be found in 
Latin America or Portugal.  Moreover, much of 
industry is still British-owned. T he  country con­
tinues to be a generator as well as an importer 
of capital, technology, arms, equipm ent and 
cultural artefacts (such as television programmes). 
It continues to absorb im migrant m anpow er of 
various types (especially from the Irish Republic), 
even if the net inflow is now negligible; and many 
British tourists continue to visit the Continent, 
a lthough there is now a strong flow in the opposite 
direction. Britain is, moreover, a country which 
has been falling behind ra ther than failing to 
catch up.
But the question is not the trivial quasi-joke 
abou t  w hether Britain is a ‘developing’ country. 
It is whether the insights gained in development 
studies would be helpful to those working on 
British problems, in view of its dependence on 
foreign-based TN C s, and the difficulty its govern­
ment finds in reducing the pace of inflation, the 
foreign exchange deficit and the level of unemploy- 
v ment (despite exceptional trade union cooperation 
and m ounting revenues from N o rth  Sea gas and 
oil) (M Phil faculty and students, 1977).
Typical symptoms of dependence are the tendency 
to await an acceleration of economic growth 
in the United States as the solution to national 
economic problems, a reliance on T N C s  for new 
investment bringing modern  technology— as in 
the N o rth  Sea oilfields— and the publicity given 
to arrivals of IM F  missions. (It is ra ther curious, 
even dispiriting, to hear in Britain now the same 
old argum ents for and against ‘monetarist’ policies 
which have dom inated  Latin American economic 
controversy for the last quarter-century. British 
politicians are apparently , like British economists, 
too parochial even to be aware of them.)
Development studies have made us familiar with 
the corc-periphery concept: Western Europe seems 
to have its own core and periphery. W hat is more, 
there is a definite geographical pattern to it, with 
the European  periphery3 forming a ring around  
the core, whether defined in terms of countr ies 
or o f regions cutting across national boundaries
3 T h is  co n cep t w ill be exp lored  m ore fu lly  in later work.
(including in the core, for example, N orthern  
Italy and most of England).
This raises a num ber of intriguing questions. How 
is this European pattern related to the dependence 
of the whole of Western E urope on the United 
States? To what extent can we see a similar 
pattern in Eastern Europe? If so, is the core East 
G erm any? In tha t  case, can we speak of a con­
tinental dependence system (a ‘new o rder’?) in 
Europe based on G erm any, West and East? Does 
this suggest an eventual integration of Eastern 
and Western Europe? O r is the whole of Eastern 
Europe too heavily dependent on the Soviet 
Union?
Insights acquired from work in the development 
field would throw light on several European 
policy issues, including those raised by the en­
largement of the EEC. For  example, anyone who 
has worked on industrial or agricultural policy 
overseas will know that a simplistic cost-benefit 
analysis based on internal rates of re turn  for 
individual projects such as EEC  financial agencies 
use (Bienefeld and Seers, 1976), will be far from 
suitable fo r evaluating sectoral o r  local p ro ­
grammes with objectives that include reducing 
unemployment and inequality. (Aid agencies such 
as O D M  might well turn  their a ttention and  at 
least a small par t  of their resources to  such 
problems: they should certainly be involved in 
negotiations on enlargement.)
This extension of development studies also has 
interesting implications for ‘N orth -S ou th ’ negotia­
tions. If certain countries of Europe, including 
Britain, and the Third  World share problems 
with com m on causes, then is there not a basis 
for much greater cooperation in international 
fora, such as U N C T A D , on many issues fo r 
example monitoring the T N C s? A nd might not 
European governments benefit from technical 
assistance from agencies with international ex­
perience in problems like structural unemployment 
(e.g. the ILO)?
This geographical extension of development 
studies would not merely contribute to a deeper 
understanding of European problems, but also 
conversely throw light on the problems of the 
countries conventionally covered by development 
studies. The ring-like periphery of Europe prompts 
us to reflect on the wider significance of spatial 
analysis, and to look for similar patterns in other 
areas: the N orthern  half of the Western Hemi­
sphere, Southern Africa and the South Pacific 
spring to mind. This would be a refinement on the 
som ewhat global core-periphery analysis current 
in development studies.
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Political expedience and development studies
W hat stops the inclusion of the European peri­
phery in development studies? It is the conven­
tion under which the field deals with aided co u n ­
tries. The origins of its current definitions lie in 
political expendiency allied to commercialism, 
hum anitar ian ism  and academic territorialism— a 
powerful and somewhat unholy alliance.
As the Cold W ar intensified in the 1950s and 
form er colonies became independent, political 
attention in the metropolitan countries focused on 
problems of ‘underdevelopment’, which were seen 
as potential breeding grounds for communism. 
W hen three groupings emerged in the politics of 
international organisations— the ‘developed’ co un ­
tries with high per capita incomes, the ‘centrally 
p lanned’, and the large residual category of the 
‘developing’— the last was treated as qualitatively 
different and alone in need of support f rom  aid 
agencies and development economists.
This tripartite division of the world was of course 
both novel and highly artificial. But, as I have 
pointed out earlier (Seers, 1976), it did have some 
basis in reality. It recognised the com m on p ro b ­
lems and interests of the governments of ‘devel­
oping’ countries vis a vis the companies and 
governments of richer countries) and their co m ­
mon historic resentments. The  governments in 
the ‘developed’ countries were prepared to institute 
aid programmes designed, inter alia, to keep those 
outside the communist bloc still ‘developing’. Yet 
it allowed the bureaucratic class in the communist 
countr ies to consider governments of various 
political complexions as anti-imperialist, and to 
lend them diplomatic support while leaving to the 
imperial powers themselves the responsibili ty 
for financial and technical aid.
Soon the three world classification acquired a life 
of its own. Typically, the governing councils of 
international agencies have balanced representa­
tion between ‘centrally-planned’, ‘developed’ and 
‘developing' countries, and so have their com m it­
tees, expert groups, missions, etc. M any govern­
ments of ‘developing’ countr ies have come to 
consider ‘Third  World unity’ a m ajor  source of 
strength. All sorts of institutions have grown up 
to facilitate ‘South-South’ and ‘N orth -S ou th ’ 
discussions and negotiations.
Academic work in ‘developed’ countr ies on the 
problems of the ‘developing’ countries was also 
influenced; though it had  started much earlier, 
especially in the fields of anthropolgy and colonial 
economies. When aid departments and the United 
Nations agencies and regional commissions were
established, in response to the various political 
interests mentioned above, much  greater o p p o r­
tunities were provided for bo th  field and desk 
research on ‘developing' countries. Special devel­
opment institutions such as ID S  were also set up.
Those engaged in research in this field have 
accepted the geographical definition used by its 
sponsors.4 M oreover, one is b ound  to say that 
some of it has not been as objective as is perhaps 
customary in the social sciences. T here  has been 
an implicit assumption tha t the ult im ate  goals 
would be European-style political institutions and 
levels of living within a capitalist system— basically 
the same goals as those of colonial governments. 
M any researchers in colonial times and  subse­
quently have also assumed (usually tacitly) that 
those with political power were sufficiently m ot i­
vated and efficient to achieve these ends, and  tha t  
they could and would make good use of technical 
and financial assistance. This has am oun ted  to a 
new (though very different) ‘trahaison des clercs’. 
E labora te  models were w orked out to help policy­
makers accelerate economic grow th and  (when 
political concerns changed) to deal with problem s 
such as high-level m anpow er shortages, u n em ­
ployment, inequality and  poverty. D evelopm ent 
research in all these areas has been m arked  by 
conceptual imprecision and  a very casual use of 
statistics— as was inevitable if ‘results’ were to be 
provided for policy-makers, bu t p r im ary  da ta  
were meagre or non-existent.
Several developm ent courses were established in 
Europe. These were m ore  or less explicitly 
designed to ‘tra in ’ people how  to run their own 
countries (often being succesors to colonial service 
courses), though  they sometimes also had places 
for those from  ‘developed’ countries w ho were 
primarily  interested in the problem s of the ‘Third  
W orld ’.
M any  European  academics have also been heavily 
involved in advisory w ork  on ‘deve lopm ent’. 
These have often done little or no similar work 
on the problems of their own countries. T he  very 
unders tandable  desire to do something abou t the
4 T h e  idea o f treating E u rop ean  cou n tr ies as cases for d e v e lo p ­
m en t is n o t, h o w ev er , really  at all n o v e l. D e v e lo p m e n t  
stu d ies w ere born in E u rop e. I am  n o t referring to the  
w ork o f A dam  Sm ith  or K arl M arx or ev en  th e in d u stria l­
isation  d eb ate in the S o v iet U n io n  in the 1920s: the first 
tw o d ev e lo p m en t stu d ies in the m o d ern  sen se  w ere w ritten
by R osen ste in -R o d a n  (1943) and M a rtin , n e  M an d elb au m  
(1947). T h e y  dealt w ith  the p ost-w ar  d ev e lo p m en t n eed s  of
Eastern and S o u th -E a stern  E u rop e. T h e se  w ere  fo llo w e d
by w ork  on  the Italian S ou th  by R o sen ste in -R o d a n , C h cn ery  
and others. T h is  w ork  on  E u rop e w as, h o w ev er , su b m erged  
in  the sw ellin g  torrent of research  on  A frica , A sia  and
Latin  A m erica.
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poverty of the rura l  masses in the tropics has 
been reinforced by ra ther  flattering invitations to 
propose solutions to their problems.
Inevitably, much of this work has been super­
ficial. We economists in particular have often 
offered advice w ithout much knowledge of the 
history or the political context of the country con­
cerned and  therefore  with little basis for framing 
the questions to be studied, let alone predicting 
the results of our advice. In fact, we have rarely 
know n or even enquired w hat political interests 
our visits have served (and often the real motive 
of an invitation has been to obtain our signatures 
ra ther  than our opinions).  The  actual outcome of 
such well-meaning intervention has sometimes 
been inadvertently to strengthen regimes obstruct­
ing the very changes we have advocated— which 
may of course sometimes have been the intention 
all along of the d o n o r  agencies sponsoring our 
travels. Indeed, there is now a fairly widespread 
disillusion abou t  the effectiveness of high-level 
technical assistance in the face of powerful 
hostility to social change or indifference.
Events in recent years, especially the ‘oil crisis’ 
and the subsequent recession, have made the 
three-world classification m uch  less realistic. As 
explained above, some European  countries have 
developed ‘Latin A m erican’ symptoms: indeed, 
few of them are acceptable any longer as models 
to the rest of the world n o r  do their governments 
have the resources— given their domestic p ro b ­
lems— to sustain big aid program m es or pa te rna l­
istic roles. C om m unis t  countries have also devel­
oped unevenly and  no longer fo rm  such a h o m o ­
geneous group  with respect to either institutions 
or policy. T he  growing detente between their 
governm ents  and  those of capitalist countries 
raises basic questions abo u t  the rationale of a 
world classification that originated in the Cold 
War. E no rm o us  differences in politico-economic 
power have also appeared  within the Third World. 
T he  per capita  incomes of most oil exporters and 
of some other countr ies— to take the com m on 
yardstick on  the conventional approach— now 
exceed those of some E uropean  countr ies (indeed 
K uw ait  has the highest per capita  income in the 
world), and  w hat is m ore  to the point, their 
governm ents  have essential products to sell and 
capital to invest.
O ne can perhaps see parallels with the blurring of 
class divisions inside E uropean  countr ies, where 
sections of the working class have achieved a 
bargain ing strength and  income levels higher than 
m any of those conventionally  considered ‘middle 
class’ (and labour studies have been extended
beyond their traditional field, the manual 
workers).
The oil crisis not merely undermined the 
old three-world classification, and demonstrated 
that there were o ther ways of obtaining capital 
than waiting for aid, it threw d oub t  on the 
basically optimistic assumptions tha t underlay 
much of the research and advice in this field. 
Limits to oil and other non-renewable resources 
have raised serious doubts whether all the 
countries of the world will become ‘developed’ 
even in the remote future, and their populations 
as a whole able to afford cars and other elements 
in the level of living of the European working 
class. While we are no t entering a ‘zero sum ’ 
game, the sum no longer seems infinite.
International relations are characterised by a 
new ruthlessness, and the position of many 
‘developed’ countr ies, especially those dependent 
on imported oil, has become precarious. As 
happened inside the industrial countries them ­
selves, the representatives of the poor are no t wait­
ing any more for charitable  concessions, but 
starting to organise to extract w hat they can.
The quandary of the European academic
W hat is the E uropean  social scientist to do? 
Certainly some will continue to carry out research, 
training and consultancy exclusively on behalf of 
‘developing’ countries and much of this has no 
doub t a certain value. Often the underlying 
assumption is that it is desirable to redistr ibute 
income towards these countries, however, the 
idea of a E uropean devoting his energies to shift­
ing resources to foreign governments now seems 
ra ther anomalous, especially if they go to support 
and strengthen the bureaucracy. Yet advocacy of 
redistribution inside o ther countries raises u n ­
comfortable  questions abou t paternalism and the 
propriety of urging sacrifices on other bourgeois, 
quite apart  from the very doubtful effectiveness 
of such advice. A nalogous questions are raised 
even more sharply for those whose work implies 
the need for others to carry  out revolutions.
This complex of intellectual and moral uncer­
tainties recalls the doubts tha t  troubled the E u ro ­
pean intelligentsia in the Reformation. The reality 
is that there is very little we can do as either 
officials or academics to improve social conditions 
in other continents— although we can perhaps 
make them worse! It is not surprising that some 
E uropean  social scientists w ho had specialised in 
development have been leaving the field. F or  
those who remain, the first step in changing our
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role is to acknowledge the obvious social and 
political problems in our own country; the second 
is to accept the validity and utility o f nationalism 
as a shield against dependence; and the third to 
realise that transfers of resources to countries 
which are poorer may well, given the extent o f 
ou r  own problems and the difficulties of reaching 
those in real need, not increase net welfare.
F o r  some, the next step after this is to search for 
interface policies that will reconcile the needs of 
those in developed and developing countries. 
Others see their task as exploring— in alliance 
with the ecologists— what changes in lifestyles 
in developed countries would relieve the pressure 
on oil and other scarce resources, thus creating 
greater economic space for satisfying basic needs 
in poorer countries.  1 will not go into detail here 
on the pros and cons of these new approaches. 
They are certainly much healthier than the old 
concern with the policies of foreign governments. 
But they raise big questions of political feasibility 
and do not entirely avoid the invidious task of 
defining other  people 's needs.
Perhaps some European social scientists need to 
draw more far-reaching conclusions. The kernel 
of development studies will surely become the 
concentration of economic and political power, 
and the consequent creation of poverty, both 
absolute and relative, wherever this occurs, not 
just in the so-called Third World, but also in 
Europe. This process of marginalisation is not 
purely economic: it includes threats to national, 
regional or ethnic identity. Its study involves 
analysis of the institutions, especially in ternational 
which in various ways transmit the techniques, 
tastes, theories and ideologies that generate in­
equality— including inequalities between and 
within European countries.
Explaining its causal dynamics leads into deeper 
historical, as well as broader geographical,  analy­
sis than has been customary in our field so far. 
It means investigating the origins of the present 
world structure, especially the creation and dis­
olution of the colonial system, which was of 
course based in Europe, and drawing on all parts 
of the world for case studies in teaching as well 
as research.
The professionalisation of development studies 
will be helped by their extension to European 
countries and vice versa. Besides providing fresh 
insights into national and regional problems in 
Europe, the application of development analysis 
there will make obsolete, at least in academic 
work, the professionally dubious distinction 
between 'developed' and ‘developing’ countries,
the models and the emulators .5 Conversely, it is 
difficult to extend development studies to Europe 
until we have discarded a classification ot c o u n ­
tries which originated primarily in political 
expediency.
T ha t there are strongly entrenched vested interests 
against this change of emphasis is implicit in the 
foregoing analysis. T o  aban d on  the 'Th ird  World 
as a category, and give up using the phrase itself, 
would dilute the political cement holding together 
a coalition which has become even more useful to 
the governments of the countries concerned. 
'N or th-South '  negotiations would lose their 
rationale:6 indeed both ‘N o r th ’ and 'S ou th ’ would 
disappear as concepts (though of course the basic 
issues of commodity and energy policy and so 
forth would still need to be discussed).
The new approach threatens the political co n ­
stituency of the bilateral aid adminis trator,  based 
on transnational corporations and voluntary 
agencies, and seems heartless to those whose 
main concern is hum anitar ian . Some on the West 
European Left would find it hard  to accept the 
validity of their own country 's  interests. Officials 
in Com m unist  countries would be very suspicious 
of their own internal problems being put in this 
framework. Any E uropean  governm ent (West or 
East) would find it hard to cooperate  politically 
with governments of ‘developing’ countries o r to 
apply for technical assistance, in part because of 
the residues of paternalism. Fundam enta l  changes 
would be needed in the structures and  procedures 
of international agencies and national adm in is tra ­
tions.
A heavy cost would also be borne by academics 
themselves: research covering exclusively 'devel­
oping' (or, for that matter, exclusively 'developed') 
countries would quickly become obsolete, lecture
5 I am so m etim es asked how  I recon cile  m y p resen t p o sitio n  
w ith  m y critic ism s in the early  1960s o f the naive tran sfer  
o f eco n o m ic  theories d ev e lo p ed  in  E u rop e and N o rth  
A m erica to cou ntr ies in other con tin en ts  w ith  q u ite  differen t  
in stitu tio n s— e.g . in m y  ‘T h e  L im ita tion s of the S p ecia l C a se ’ 
(originally  p u b lish ed  in B u lle t in ,  O xford  In stitu te  o f  E c o n ­
o m ics and S ta tistics, 1962). In  th e  first p lace, that battle 
has partly b een  w on: social sc ien ce  sy lla b u ses  o f u n iv ersitie s  
in other con tin en ts are n o  longer  m o d e lle d  so  c lo se ly  on  
those o f E urpe and N o rth  A m erica . B u t. in a d d itio n , th e  
changes ou tlin ed  above in the in ternation al scen e  have  
created con d itio n s in w h ich  it is m ore  co n stru ctiv e  n o w  to  
em p h asise  the com m on  e le m e n ts  o f p ro b lem s. B e s id e s , I 
was then arguing against transferring th eories d ev ised  for 
the ‘d e v e lo p ed ’ cou ntr ies to  th e T h ird  W orld . I am n ow  
ad vocating a transfer in the reverse d irection : it se em s that 
the th eories d ev ised  for the ‘d e v e lo p e d ’ co u n tr ies  (su ch  as 
K ey n esia n  and other form s o f n eo -cla ss ica l eco n o m ics) are 
ceasin g to be appropriate even  in the cou n tr ies  w h ere  they  
originated .
6 r h e  N o rth -S o u th  ‘d ia lo g u e’ reflects the seating  arrangem ents  
in the B ritish  H o u se  o f C o m m o n s, w h ere the parties c o n ­
fron t each other: on e m igh t v iew  th e w orld  p o litica l structure  
as m ore like the co n tin u o u s arc o f the F ren ch  C h am b er.
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notes in the field of development studies might 
have to be torn  up, reading lists substantially 
revised and inventories of textbooks written off. 
Libraries would need to be reorganised and their 
purchasing policies broadened. T ra in ing  courses 
(if ‘tra in ing’ is the right word in this field) would 
have to include E uropean  material,  and to aim 
at the enro lm ent of students from  E urope who 
are working on E uropean  problems and of 
teachers from  other continents. Offers of con­
sultancies would be treated much m ore  warily. 
Development studies as redefined above would 
no d o ub t  remain a separate field characterised 
by interdisciplinarity, an historical approach, an 
emphasis on international de term inants  and a 
focus on institutional issues. It would still be 
m arked by greater concern fo r  social problems, 
part icularly  poverty, than  is custom ary among 
academ ic social scientists, and  greater  need for 
the first-hand acquain tance  with these 'p rob lem s 
tha t  can only be provided by fieldwork (though 
o f  a less paternalistic kind). But the boundaries 
dividing it from the conventional social sciences 
would be hazier and easier to violate. Those in 
developm ent institutes would have to familiarise 
themselves with work on their own country  and 
also face the ‘rigorous’ s tandards o f  their col­
leagues in disciplinary departments.  T he  latter 
on the o ther  hand  would  hardly  feel comfortable  
in closer contac t with the messy and largely 
unquantifiable  p roblem s of the real world.
It will therefore take quite some time for devel­
opm ent studies to escape from  their traditional 
boundaries. F ro m  the viewpoint o f the European  
academic, however, there w ould be m a jo r  benefits 
to offset against the short- te rm  costs o f its re­
definition. A w kw ard m oral tensions would be 
eased. Challenging possibilities would be opened 
up for more objective and fundam enta l  research, 
based (to the extent that quanti tative analysis is 
possible) on p roper  statistics. We would be less 
at the mercy of changes in political winds. O ur 
own social science syllabuses could be made more 
relevant to ou r  own continental , national and 
regional problems. In addition, European social 
scientists could become genuine colleagues of 
those in other continents— something hardly 
possible so long as developm ent studies exclude 
Europe.
We are  b rought back therefore to the old- 
fashioned conclusion that academics had  best use
long spoons when supping with politicians. Their  
immunity from political pressures has been de­
fended on the ground that it was necessary for 
innovative professional work. In development 
studies, this defence has been imparied. 1 am not, 
however, suggesting that the subject’s social 
relevance should be reduced; ra ther tha t  those 
inside governm ent o r outside should be left to 
draw  whatever conclusions are  relevant to their 
own occupation, nationality and ideology. The 
study of the constraints on national policy is 
potentially significant for people of many types, 
inside or outside government. Politicians and 
officials may well take more notice of the con­
tributions of academics who are less partisan, 
and therefore more readily reconsider the assum p­
tions on which their aproaches are  based.
But that would be so-to-speak a by-product. A 
more im portant result of some degree of detach­
ment of development studies from the aid lobby is 
that this would facili tate the coverage of 
European problems. While it can be argued 
plausibly (if perhaps mistakenly) that development 
theory and experience, as conventionally defined, 
can contribute little to the analysis of the p ro b ­
lems of countries such as the United States and 
the Soviet Union, this is obviously untrue of 
Portugal and other countries in the European 
periphery. They provide the bridge for the ex­
tension and thus professionalisation of develop­
ment studies.
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